Showing posts with label World War II. Show all posts
Showing posts with label World War II. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

The Consumption Tax: A Critique


By Murray Rothbard

The Alleged Superiority of the Income Tax
Orthodox neoclassical economics has long maintained that, from the point of view of the taxed themselves, an income tax is "better than" an excise tax on a particular form of consumption, since, in addition to the total revenue extracted, which is assumed to be the same in both cases, the excise tax weights the levy heavily against a particular consumer good. In addition to the total amount levied, therefore, an excise tax skews and distorts spending and resources away from the consumers' preferred consumption patterns. Indifference curves are trotted out with a flourish to lend the scientific patina of geometry to this demonstration.

As in many other cases when economists rush to judge various courses of action as "good," "superior," or "optimal," however, the ceteris paribus assumptions underlying such judgments — in this case, for example, that total revenue remains the same — do not always hold up in real life. Thus, it is certainly possible, for political or other reasons, that one particular form of tax is not likely to result in the same total revenue as another. The nature of a particular tax might lead to less or more revenue than another tax. Suppose, for example, that all present taxes are abolished and that the same total is to be raised from a new capitation, or head, tax, which requires that every inhabitant of the United States pay an equal amount to the support of federal, state, and local government. This would mean that the existing total government revenue of the United States, which we estimate at $1.38 trillion — and here exact figures are not important — would have to be divided between an approximate total of 243 million people. Which would mean that every man, woman, and child in America would be required to pay to government each and every year, $5,680. Somehow, I don't believe that anything like this large a sum could be collectible by the authorities, no matter how many enforcement powers are granted the IRS. A clear example where the ceteris paribus assumption flagrantly breaks down.

But a more important, if less dramatic, example is nearer at hand. Before World War II, Internal Revenue collected the… (Read more)

Source: Mises.org

Sunday, November 13, 2011

U.S.-Japanese Relations before WWII

By Percy L. Greaves Jr.
 
Relations with Japan had been strained for some time. The Roosevelt administration was fully aware of Japan's dependence on imports. Yet, as we have seen, it had terminated America's long-standing commercial treaty with her. After January 1940 Japan had to ask permission on a case-by-case basis whenever she wanted to import from the United States. In July 1940 the administration had further prohibited exports to Japan by requiring her to get a license to purchase aircraft engines and strategic materials. (When sale of aviation gas, defined by the United States as 86 octane or higher, was embargoed on July 1, 1940, she had contrived a way to use 76 octane in her planes.) The administration was tightening an economic noose around Japan's neck bit by bit, forcing her to look elsewhere for the supplies and materials she had been accustomed to buying from the United States.
 
The Japanese had considerable commercial interests in Southeast Asia, especially in French Indochina (now comprising the states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). After France fell in June 1940, Japan had negotiated with the Vichy government of unoccupied France for permission to occupy French Indochina, to take over bases there, and to maintain order. The rather helpless Vichy government had agreed. As trade with the United States became more difficult, Japan's interests in Indochina gained in importance and she turned more and more in that direction for the foods and raw materials she needed. Trade pacts concluded later with Indochina assured Japan of uninterrupted supplies of rice, rubber, and other needed raw materials.
 
US Ambassador Grew in Japan kept Roosevelt fully advised of her precarious economic situation and urgent need for imports. Chief of Naval Operations (NCO) Stark had warned the president of the danger of imposing an oil embargo on Japan. Stark had "made it known to the State Department in no uncertain terms that in my opinion if Japan's oil were shut off, she would go to war." He did not mean… (Read more)
 
Source: Mises.org

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, and War

By Murray N. Rothbard

During the 1930s, the Rockefellers pushed hard for war against Japan, which they saw as competing with them vigorously for oil and rubber resources in Southeast Asia and as endangering the Rockefellers' cherished dreams of a mass "China market" for petroleum products. On the other hand, the Rockefellers took a noninterventionist position in Europe, where they had close financial ties with German firms such as I.G. Farben and Co., and very few close relations with Britain and France.

The Morgans, in contrast, as usual deeply committed to their financial ties with Britain and France, once again plumped early for war with Germany, while their interest in the Far East had become minimal. Indeed, US ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, former Morgan partner, was one of the few officials in the Roosevelt administration genuinely interested in peace with Japan.

World War II might therefore be considered, from one point of view, as a coalition war: the Morgans got their war in Europe, the Rockefellers theirs in Asia. Such disgruntled Morgan men as… (Read the full article)

Source: Mises.org