Secretary Geithner to Travel to China and Japan Next Week

Trip to Highlight Issues Including State of the Global Economy, Stronger Growth and Increased Pressure on Iran

 

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced that Secretary Tim Geithner will travel to Beijing, China and Tokyo, Japan January 10-12, 2012, for meetings with senior government officials in both countries to discuss the state of the global economy, policies to strengthen global growth and other economic issues of mutual importance. Secretary Geithner will also discuss our continued coordination with international partners in the region to increase pressure on the Government of Iran, including financial measures targeting the Central Bank of Iran.

 

On Tuesday, January 10, Secretary Geithner will arrive in Beijing for a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan. The following day, he will meet with Premier Wen Jiabao, Vice President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang to discuss measures to promote continued economic growth and level the playing field for U.S. workers and firms. The Secretary’s visit to Beijing comes ahead of Vice President Xi’s visit to Washington later this year.

 

On Thursday, January 12, the Secretary will be in Tokyo, Japan for meetings with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Finance Minister Jun Azumi and other senior government officials to confer on the U.S. and Japanese economies and cooperation on efforts to support strong, sustainable and balanced global growth.

 

Additional details will be announced in the coming days.

Remarks by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

As Prepared for Delivery

 

Thank you, Secretary Clinton.

 

I want to thank you, and I want to commend my colleague at Treasury, David Cohen, and his counterparts here at the State Department for working so hard to put together today’s very significant financial actions.

 

Since President Obama came into office, this administration has put in place an aggressive strategy to stop Iran’s illicit activities.  A key part of this strategy has been to impose overwhelming financial pressure on Iran. 

 

Because of this strategy, Iran has been subjected to new and damaging levels of financial and commercial isolation. 

 

First, we have dramatically reduced Iran’s access to the international financial system.  Iranian banks are losing the ability to do business around the world, which in turn has reduced the ability of the Iranian government to finance activities opposed by the international community.

 

Second, Iran’s national shipping line – which has transported material in support of Iran’s missile program – is now shut off from many of the world’s major ports and routinely finds its ships seized or turned away.

 

And third, Iran’s primary source of revenue – its oil sector – is in decline, because it cannot attract the foreign investment that it desperately needs to maintain production.

 

Together, the intensification of sanctions by this Administration, alongside our partners around the world, has inflicted substantial damage to the Iranian economy.

 

To continue these efforts, the Treasury Department today is designating additional entities for their support of Iran’s nuclear and proliferation-related activities.

 

Today we are also taking the next significant step to escalate the pressure by acting under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. For the first time, we are identifying the entire Iranian banking sector – including the Central Bank of Iran – as a threat to governments or financial institutions that do business with Iranian banks.

 

If you are a financial institution and you engage in any transaction involving Iran’s Central Bank or any other Iranian bank operating inside or outside Iran, you are at risk of supporting Iran’s illicit activities:  its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support for terrorism, and its efforts to deceive responsible financial institutions and evade sanctions.

 

Any and every financial transaction with Iran poses grave risk of supporting those activities.

 

Financial institutions around the world should think hard about the risks of doing business with Iran.

 

We are taking this latest action alongside our partners in the United Kingdom and Canada, who announced earlier today that they have implemented similar measures to insulate their banks from Iran. As a result of this coordinated effort, Iran is now cut off from three of the world’s largest financial sectors. 

 

We encourage other leaders around the world to take forceful steps – like the action we are announcing today – to prevent Iran from simply shifting financial activity to banks within their nations. 

 

As we put these new measures in place, and as we continue to work to expand their reach around the world, we will continue to explore other measures.  No option is off the table—including the possibility of imposing additional sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran.

 

The policies Iran is pursuing are unacceptable.  Until Iran’s leadership agrees to abandon this dangerous course, we will continue to use tough and innovative means to impose severe economic and financial consequences on Iran’s leadership.  

 

Thank you.

Measures to Increase Pressure on Iran

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

 

Secretary of Treasury Tim Geithner

November 21, 2011

 

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon, everyone. I am delighted to welcome Secretary Geithner here to the Treaty Room of the State Department, and I also welcome his team and thank my team for the work that they have been doing with respect to Iran.

 

Recent days have brought new evidence that Iran’s leaders continue to defy their international obligations and violate international norms, including the recent plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in the United States and as verified by the new report from the International Atomic Energy Agency that further documents Iran’s conduct of activities directly related to the development of nuclear weapons. Now, this report from the IAEA is not the United States or our European partners making accusations; this is the result of an independent review and it reflects the judgment of the international community.

 

There have to be consequences for such behavior. So on Friday, Iran was condemned in votes at the UN in New York and at the IAEA in Vienna. And earlier today, the UN General Assembly again strongly reprimanded Iran for continuing human rights abuses, persecution of minorities, and forcible restrictions on political freedom. The message is clear: If Iran’s intransigence continues, it will face increasing pressure and isolation.

 

Today the United States is taking a series of steps to sharpen this choice.

 

First, President Obama signed an Executive Order that, for the first time, specifically targets Iran’s petrochemical industry, a significant source of export revenues and a cover for imports for sanctioned activities. This will allow us to sanction the provision of goods, services, and technology to the petrochemical sector. To accompany this new measure, we will launch a worldwide diplomatic campaign to encourage other countries to shift any purchases of Iranian petrochemical products to other suppliers.

 

Second, in the same Executive Order, we are expanding sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas business. U.S. law already sanctions large-scale investments in up-stream exploration and development of oil and gas, and now it will also be sanctionable to provide goods, services, and technology for those activities as well. This will make it more difficult for Iran to work around the sanctions and will further impede efforts to maintain and modernize its oil and gas sector.

 

Third, under an existing Executive Order, we are designating a number of individuals and entities

 

for their roles in assisting Iran’s prohibited nuclear programs, including its enrichment and heavy water programs. Their assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen and American individuals and entities will be prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them.

 

And finally, as Secretary Geithner will discuss in more detail, the Treasury Department is formally identifying Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. This is the strongest official warning we can give that any transaction with Iran poses serious risks of deception or diversion.

 

These steps were accompanied today by complementary measures by the UK and Canada, and we expect additional sanctions by other international partners in the days ahead.

 

Together, these measures represent a significant ratcheting up of pressure on Iran, its sources of income, and its illegal activities. They build on an extensive existing sanctions regime put into place by the UN Security Council and a large number of countries, including our own, acting nationally and multilaterally to implement the Council’s measures. And these sanctions are already having a dramatic effect. They have almost completely isolated Iran from the international financial sector and have made it very risky and costly a place to do business.

 

Most of the world’s major energy companies have left, undermining Iran’s efforts to boost its declining oil production, its main source of revenues. Iran has found it much more difficult to operate its national airline and shipping companies, and to procure equipment and technology for its prohibited weapons programs. And those individuals and organizations responsible for terrorism and human rights abuses, including the Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Qods Force, have been specifically targeted.

 

The impact will only grow unless Iran’s leaders decide to change course and meet their international obligations. And let me be clear: Today’s actions do not exhaust our opportunities to sanction Iran. We continue actively to consider a range of increasingly aggressive measures. We have worked closely with Congress and have put to effective use the legislative tools they have provided. We are committed to continuing our collaboration to develop additional sanctions that will have the effect we all want: putting strong pressure on Iran.

 

Now, the Administration’s dual-track strategy is not only about pressure. It is also about engaging Iran, engagement that would be aimed at resolving the international community’s serious and growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. And the United States is committed to engagement, but only – and I say only – if Iran is prepared to engage seriously and concretely without preconditions. So far, we have seen little indication that Iran is serious about negotiations on its nuclear program. And until we do, and until Iran’s leaders live up to their international obligations, they will face increasing consequences.

 

Now I would like to invite Secretary Geithner to explain in more depth how some of these sanctions will be working.

 

Tim.

 

SECRETARY GEITHNER: Thank you, Secretary Clinton, and my compliments also to your colleagues and to ours – to mine, led by David Cohen and Danny Glaser, for doing such a great job today on these very significant financial actions.

 

Since the President came into office, this Administration has executed a very aggressive strategy to stop Iran’s illicit activities. A key part of this strategy has been to impose overwhelming financial pressure on Iran, and because of this strategy, Iran has been subjected to new and damaging levels of financial and commercial isolation.

 

First, we have dramatically reduced Iran’s access to the international financial system. Iranian banks are losing the ability to do business around the world, which in turn has reduced the ability of the government to finance activities opposed by the international community.

 

Second, Iran’s national shipping line, which has transported material in support of Iran’s missile program, is now shut off from many of the world’s major ports and routinely finds its ships seized or turned away.

 

And third, Iran’s primary source of revenue, its oil sector, is in decline because it cannot attract the foreign investment that it desperately needs to maintain levels of production.

 

Together, the intensification of sanctions by this Administration, alongside our partners around the world, has inflicted substantial damage to the Iranian economy. To continue these efforts, the Treasury Department today is designating additional entities for their support of Iran’s nuclear and proliferation-related activities.

 

Today, we are taking the very significant step of acting under Section 311 of the Patriot Act. For the first time, we are identifying the entire Iranian banking sector, including the Central Bank of Iran, as a threat to governments or financial institutions that do business with Iranian banks. If you are a financial institutions anywhere in the world and you engage in any transaction involving Iran’s central bank or any other Iranian bank operating inside or outside Iran, then you are at risk of supporting Iran’s illicit activities: its support – its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support for terrorism, and its efforts to deceive responsible financial institutions and to evade sanctions. Any and every financial transaction with Iran poses grave risk of supporting those activities, so financial institutions around the world should think hard about the risks of doing business with Iran.

 

We are taking this action, as the Secretary said, alongside our partners in the United Kingdom and Canada, who announced earlier today that they were implementing similar measures to insulate their banks from Iran. And as a result of this coordinated effort, Iran is now cut off from three of the world’s largest financial sectors. We encourage other leaders around the world to take forceful steps like these actions to prevent Iran from simply shifting financial activity to banks within their nations.

 

As we put these new measures in place and as we continue to work to expand their reach around the world, we will continue to explore other measures. No option is off the table, including the possibility of imposing additional sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. The policies Iran is pursuing are unacceptable, and until Iran’s leadership agrees to abandon this dangerous course, we will continue to use tough and innovative means to impose severe economic and financial consequences on Iran’s leadership.

 

Thank you.

 

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you all very much.

Treasury Designates Iranian Commercial Airline Linked to Iran's Support for Terrorism

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today the designation of Iranian commercial airline Mahan Air pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Based in Tehran, Mahan Air provides transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel services to the IRGC-QF.

 

“Mahan Air’s close coordination with the IRGC-QF – secretly ferrying operatives, weapons and funds on its flights – reveals yet another facet of the IRGC’s extensive infiltration of Iran’s commercial sector to facilitate its support for terrorism,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.  “Following the revelation about the IRGC-QF’s use of the international financial system to fund its murder-for-hire plot, today’s action highlights further the undeniable risks of doing business with Iran.”

 

Mahan Air provided travel services to IRGC-QF personnel flown to and from Iran and Syria for military training. Mahan Air also facilitated the covert travel of suspected IRGC-QF officers into and out of Iraq by bypassing normal security procedures and not including information on flight manifests to eliminate records of the IRGC-QF travel.

 

Mahan Air crews have facilitated IRGC-QF arms shipments. Funds were also transferred via Mahan Air for the procurement of controlled goods by the IRGC-QF.

 

In addition to the reasons for which Mahan Air is being designated today, Mahan Air also provides transportation services to Hizballah, a Lebanon-based designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Mahan Air has transported personnel, weapons and goods on behalf of Hizballah and omitted from Mahan Air cargo manifests secret weapons shipments bound for Hizballah.

 

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with Mahan Air and any assets it may hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

 

Identifying Information:

 

Entity: Mahan Air

AKA: Mahan Travel Company

Address: Mahan Air Tower, 21st Floor, Azadeghan Street, Karaj Highway, P.O. Box 14515-411, Tehran, Iran

Alt. Address:  Mahan Air Tower, Azadegan St., Karaj Highway, Tehran 1481655761, Iran P.O. Box 411-14515

Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of five individuals, including four senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) officers connected to a plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. As part of today’s action, Treasury also designated the individual responsible for arranging the assassination plot on behalf of the IRGC-QF.

 

Designated today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF were: Manssor Arbabsiar, a naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports who acted on behalf of the IRGC-QF to pursue the failed plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador; IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani; Hamed Abdollahi, a senior IRGC-QF official who coordinated aspects of the plot and oversaw the other Qods Force officials directly responsible for coordinating and planning this operation; Abdul Reza Shahlai, an IRGC-QF official who coordinated this operation; and Ali Gholam Shakuri, an IRGC-QF official and deputy to Shahlai, who met with Arbabsiar on several occasions to discuss the assassination and other planned attacks.

 

Arbabsiar and Shakuri were named by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York in a criminal complaint unsealed today connected with the IRGC-QF plot. Among the charges brought against them was conspiracy to engage in foreign travel and use interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. According to the criminal complaint, Arbabsiar arranged for $100,000 to be sent from Tehran to the U.S. as a down payment for the assassination of the Saudi ambassador. Two wire transfers totaling approximately $100,000 were sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to a bank in the United States, to the account of the person recruited by Arbabsiar to carry out the assassination.

 

“Iran once again has used the Qods Force and the international financial system to pursue an act of international terrorism, this time aimed against a Saudi diplomat,” said David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “The financial transactions at the heart of this plot lay bare the risk that banks and other institutions face in doing business with Iran.”

 

As a result of today’s designations, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these individuals, and any assets they may hold in the U.S. are frozen.

 

Manssor Arbabsiar

Arbabsiar met on a number of occasions with senior IRGC-QF officials regarding this plot and acted on behalf of senior Qods Force officials – including his cousin Abdul Reza Shahlai and Shahlai’s deputy Gholam Shakuri – to execute the plot. During one such meeting, a $100,000 payment for the murder of the Saudi ambassador was approved by the IRGC-QF. After this meeting, Arbabsiar arranged for approximately $100,000 to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States, to the account of the person he recruited to carry out the assassination.

 

Qasem Soleimani

As IRGC-QF Commander, Qasem Soleimani oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were involved in this plot. Soleimani was previously designated by the Treasury Department under E.O. 13382 based on his relationship to the IRGC. He was also designated in May 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13572, which targets human rights abuses in Syria, for his role as the Commander of the IRGC-QF, the primary conduit for Iran's support to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID).

 

Hamed Abdollahi

Abdollahi is also a senior IRGC-QF officer who coordinated aspects of this operation. Abdollahi oversees other Qods Force officials – including Shahlai – who were responsible for coordinating and planning this operation.

 

Abdul Reza Shahlai

Shahlai is an IRGC-QF official who coordinated the plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. Shahlai worked through his cousin, Mansour Arbabsiar, who was named in the criminal complaint for conspiring to bring the IRGC-QF’s plot to fruition. Shahlai approved financial allotments to Arbabsiar to help recruit other individuals for the plot, approving $5 million dollars as payment for all of the operations discussed.

 

Shahlai was designated by Treasury in September 2008 pursuant to E.O. 13438 for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq.

 

Ali Gholam Shakuri

Shakuri is an IRGC-QF officer and deputy to Abdul Reza Shahlai who acted on behalf of Shahlai in support of this plot. Shakuri provided financial support to Arbabsiar and met with Arbabsiar several times to discuss the planned assassination and other attacks. With Shakuri’s approval, Arbabsiar arranged for the $100,000 down payment to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States.

 

Background on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force

The IRGC-QF is the Government of Iran’s primary foreign action arm for executing its policy of supporting terrorist organizations and extremist groups around the world. The IRGC-QF provides training, logistical assistance and material and financial support to militants and terrorist operatives, including the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

 

IRGC-QF officers and their associates have supported attacks against U.S. and allied troops and diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF continues to train, equip and fund Iraqi Shia militant groups – such as Kata'ib and Hizballah – and elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan to prevent an increase in Western influence in the region. In the Levant, the IRGC-QF supports terrorist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas, which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East.

 

The Government of Iran also uses the IRGC and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, the IRGC and the Iranian government.

 

The IRGC-QF was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for its support for terrorism, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13572 of April 2011 as the conduit for Iran's support to Syria’s GID, the overarching civilian intelligence service in Syria which has been involved in human rights abuses in Syria.

Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of six members of an al-Qa’ida network headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil, a prominent Iran-based al-Qa’ida facilitator, operating under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government. Today’s action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, demonstrates that Iran is a critical transit point for funding to support al-Qa’ida’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This network serves as the core pipeline through which al-Qa’ida moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia, including to Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a key al-Qa’ida leader based in Pakistan, also designated today.

“Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today. By exposing Iran’s secret deal with al-Qa’ida allowing it to funnel funds and operatives through its territory, we are illuminating yet another aspect of Iran’s unmatched support for terrorism,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Today’s action also seeks to disrupt this key network and deny al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership much-needed support.”

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with the designees, and any assets they may hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen. Treasury designated the following individuals today:

Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al-Suri) is an Iran-based senior al-Qa’ida facilitator currently living and operating in Iran under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government. Iranian authorities maintain a relationship with Khalil and have permitted him to operate within Iran’s borders since 2005. Khalil moves money and recruits from across the Middle East into Iran, then on to Pakistan for the benefit of al-Qa’ida senior leaders, including Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Khalil has collected funding from various donors and fundraisers throughout the Gulf and is responsible for moving significant amounts of money via Iran for onward passage to al-Qa’ida’s leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has also facilitated the travel of extremist recruits for al-Qa’ida from the Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan via Iran. Khalil requires each operative to deliver $10,000 to al-Qa’ida in Pakistan.

As al-Qa’ida’s representative in Iran, Khalil works with the Iranian government to arrange releases of al-Qa’ida personnel from Iranian prisons. When al-Qa’ida operatives are released, the Iranian government transfers them to Khalil, who then facilitates their travel to Pakistan.

Atiyah Abd al-Rahman

Al-Rahman is al-Qa’ida’s overall commander in Pakistan’s tribal areas and as of late 2010, the leader of al-Qa’ida in North and South Waziristan, Pakistan. Rahman was previously appointed by Usama bin Laden to serve as al-Qa’ida’s emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of Iranian officials.

Umid Muhammadi

Muhammadi is an al-Qa’ida facilitator and key supporter of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Muhammadi has petitioned Iranian officials on al-Qa’ida’s behalf to release operatives detained in Iran. Muhammadi has been involved in planning multiple attacks in Iraq and has trained extremists in the use of explosives. He has also received training in Afghanistan on the use of rockets and chemicals.

Salim Hasan Khalifa Rashid al-Kuwari

Al-Kuwari provides financial and logistical support to al-Qa’ida, primarily through al­-Qa’ida facilitators in Iran. Based in Qatar, Kuwari has provided hundreds of thousands of dollars in financial support to al-Qa’ida and has provided funding for al-Qa’ida operations, as well as to secure the release of al-Qa’ida detainees in Iran and elsewhere. He has also facilitated travel for extremist recruits on behalf of senior al-Qa’ida facilitators based in Iran.

Abdallah Ghanim Mafuz Muslim al-Khawar

Al-Khawar has worked with Kuwari to deliver money, messages and other material support to al-Qa’ida elements in Iran. Like Kuwari, Khawar is based in Qatar and has helped to facilitate travel for extremists interested in traveling to Afghanistan for jihad.

‘Ali Hasan ‘Ali al-’Ajmi

Al-’Ajmi is a Kuwait-based associate of Khalil who provides financial and facilitation support to al-Qa’ida, AQI and the Taliban. ‘Ajmi has collected money from individuals in Gulf countries and provided these funds to AQI facilitators as well as to the Taliban. He has also supported al-Qa’ida by facilitating travel for individuals associated with the group so that they could take part in fighting in Afghanistan.

Fact Sheet: Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial Entities

Treasury Targets Commercial Infrastructure of IRGC, Exposes Continued IRGC Support for Terrorism

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury took action to designate two major Iranian commercial entities: Tidewater Middle East Co. (Tidewater) and Iran Air. Tidewater is a port operating company owned by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that has been used by the IRGC for illicit shipments.  Iran’s national airline carrier, Iran Air, is a commercial airline used by the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to transport military related equipment. Treasury also designated an individual and an entity for their ties to a company that provided support and weapons to Hizballah on behalf of the IRGC. 

The IRGC continues to be a primary focus of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran because of the central role it plays in all forms of Iran’s illicit conduct, including Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, its support for terrorism, and its involvement in serious human rights abuses.  As Iran’s isolation has increased, the IRGC has expanded its reach into critical sectors of Iran’s economic infrastructure – to the detriment of the Iranian private sector – to generate revenue and conduct business in support of Iran’s illicit activities.  Today’s actions target core commercial interests of the IRGC, while also undermining the IRGC’s ability to continue using these interests to facilitate its proliferation activities and other illicit conduct.

 

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 – an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters thereby isolating them from the U.S. commercial and financial systems – Treasury today designated:

•Tidewater Middle East Co.: for being owned by Mehr-e Eqtesad-e Iranian Investment Company, Mehr Bank and the IRGC; •Mehr-e Eqtesad-e Iranian Investment Company: for being owned or controlled by Mehr Bank.

•Iran Air: for providing material support and services to the IRGC and MODAFL, and Iran Air subsidiary Iran Air Tours. 

Pursuant to E.O. 13224, which targets for sanctions terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism, Treasury today designated:

•Iranian official Behnam Shahriyari for acting for or on behalf of Liner Transport Kish (LTK); and the Behnam Shahriyari Trading Company for being owned or controlled by Behnam Shariyari.

    

Tidewater Middle East Co. (Tidewater) Tidewater-managed ports are a crucial component of Iran’s infrastructure and transport network, and shipments into Tidewater facilities provide an avenue of revenue to the IRGC in support of its illicit conduct. The Iranian Government has repeatedly used Tidewater-managed ports to export arms or related materiel in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).

Tidewater has operations at seven Iranian ports, including Bandar Abbas’s main container terminal, Shahid Rajaee, which has played a key role in facilitating the Government of Iran’s weapons trade.

 

Tidewater operations are at the following ports:

•Bandar Abbas (Shahid Rajaee Container Terminal) •Bandar Imam Khomeini Grain Terminal •Bandar Anzali •Khorramshahr Port (one terminal) •Assaluyeh Port •Aprin Port •Amir Abad Port Complex

Incidents of weapons shipments involving Tidewater-managed facilities include:

·       An IRGC-Qods Force weapons shipment seized by Nigeria in late October 2010 was loaded at the Shahid Rajaee container terminal at Bandar Abbas.

·       A container shipment of arms-related material, which was discovered in October 2009 aboard the German-owned and IRISL-chartered ship, the Hansa India, was loaded at Bandar Abbas.

·       A container shipment of arms-related material departed Bandar Abbas in January 2009 on the Cypriot-flaged and IRISL-chartered ship, the M/V Monchegorsk, before it was stopped by the U.S. Navy and later seized by Cypriot authorities.

Tidewater was designated today for being owned by Mehr-e Eqtesad-e Iranian Investment Company, Mehr Bank and the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah, an entity formed by IRGC commanders to structure IRGC investments, along with Ansar Bank and Mehr Bank – both created by Bonyad Taavon Sepah – were designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13382 in December 2010.

Mehr-e Eqtesad-e Iranian Investment Company was also sanctioned today for being owned or controlled by IRGC-created Mehr Bank, which was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13382 in December 2010.

In August 2010, Treasury issued the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) to implement the financial provisions of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Under the IFSR, Treasury has the authority to prohibit, or impose strict conditions on, foreign financial institutions’ direct access to the U.S. financial system if they knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for the IRGC or its agents or affiliates – such as Tidewater – that have been designated by the United States under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which provides the authority for designations under E.O. 13382 and 13224. 

The entity being designated today, Tidewater Middle East Co., is separate and distinct from Tidewater Inc., an international shipping company headquartered in the United States and listed on the New York Stock Exchange as TDW.  Today's sanctions are not imposed on Tidewater Inc.

Iran Air Iran Air serves as Iran’s national air carrier, operating a fleet of approximately 40 aircraft covering 35 international and 25 domestic destinations.  Iran Air Tours is a subsidiary that operates a portion of Iran Air’s domestic flights. Iran Air has provided support and services to MODAFL and the IRGC through the transport and/or transfer of goods for, or on behalf of, these entities. On numerous occasions since 2000, Iran Air shipped military-related electronic parts and mechanical equipment on behalf of MODAFL.

MODAFL was designated by the U.S. Department of State in October 2007 under E.O. 13382 and has brokered a number of transactions involving materials and technologies with ballistic missile applications.

Iran Air has shipped military-related equipment on behalf of the IRGC since 2006, and in September and November 2008, Iran Air shipped aircraft-related raw materials to a MODAFL-associated company, including titanium sheets, which have dual-use military applications and can be used in support of advanced weapons programs.

Rockets or missiles have been transported via Iran Air passenger aircraft, and IRGC officers occasionally take control over Iran Air flights carrying special IRGC-related cargo. The IRGC is also known to disguise and manifest such shipments as medicine and generic spare parts, and IRGC officers have discouraged Iran Air pilots from inspecting potentially dangerous IRGC-related cargo being carried aboard a commercial Iran Air aircraft, including to Syria.

Additionally, commercial Iran Air flights have also been used to transport missile or rocket components to Syria.

Adopted in March 2008, UNSCR 1803 called upon all States in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran of aircraft owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft is transporting goods prohibited under UNSCR 1803 or previous UNSCRs.

Iran Air Tours serves as Iran Air’s domestic air carrier, operating a fleet of 14 aircraft connecting 13 Iranian cities with two main hubs in Tehran and Mashhad, Iran. 

Behnam Shahriyari and Shahriyari Trading Company Iranian official Behnam Shahriyari was designated today for acting for or on behalf of Liner Transport Kish (LTK), an IRGC-linked shipping company that was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13224 in December 2010 for providing material support, including weapons, to Hizballah on behalf of the IRGC.  Shahriyari acted as LTK’s business and marketing manager.  Additionally, Shahriyari operates the Behnam Shahriyari Trading Company, also designated today.

Background on the IRGC The IRGC has a growing presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors and extensive economic interests in the defense production, construction, and oil industries, controlling billions of dollars in corporate business.  Given its increased involvement in commercial activity, imposing financial sanctions on commercial enterprises of the IRGC has a direct impact on revenues that could be used by the IRGC to facilitate illicit conduct.

The IRGC was first designated by the United States pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in proliferation related activities.  The IRGC was also designated by the United States in June 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13556 for its role in the sustained and severe human rights abuses in Iran since the disputed June 2009 presidential election.  The UN, European Union, Japan, South Korea and others have all targeted the IRGC and/or its affiliates for sanctions because of its illicit activities.

Joint Statement of Secretary Geithner and Secretary Clinton On Iran Sanctions

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Departments of Treasury and State today released the following statement from Secretary Tim Geithner and Secretary Hillary Clinton on additional U.S. sanctions against Iran:

“Today, the United States imposed sanctions on Tidewater Middle East Company, an operator of Iranian ports owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that has links to Iranian proliferation activities. We also imposed sanctions against Iran Air, which was designated for providing material support and services to the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and also has facilitated proliferation-related activities.  Today’s sanctions also exposed an Iranian individual and entity for their ties to a company that provided support and weapons to Hizballah on behalf of the IRGC.

“The IRGC’s illicit activities and its increasing displacement of the legitimate Iranian private sector in major strategic industries, including in the commercial and energy sectors, are deeply troubling.  The IRGC also serves as the domestic “enforcer” for the Iranian regime, continues to play an important proliferation role by orchestrating the import and export of prohibited items to and from Iran, is involved in support of terrorism throughout the region, and is responsible for serious human rights abuses against peaceful Iranian protestors and other opposition participants.

“Preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons is a top U.S. government priority and we remain deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear intentions.  The United States is committed to a dual-track policy of applying pressure in pursuit of constructive engagement, and a negotiated solution. 

“On June 9, 2011, the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) re-affirmed their concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and their commitment to a diplomatic solution in their statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors.  Many other governments have also expressed serious concerns about the behavior and policies of the Iranian leadership and have urged Iran to change course and seek a path of negotiation.  Yet, in the face of this unified international message, Iran has continued to violate its international obligations and disregard our attempts to start meaningful negotiations over its nuclear program. 

“For this reason, the United States is convinced that the international community must continue to increase and broaden the scope of pressures on Iran.  We welcome steps such as the European Union’s designation of more than 100 entities and individuals last month and the improved implementation of sanctions against Iran that we are seeing around the world.

“This month, the United States amplified our sanctions against Iran’s leadership through a comprehensive initiative aimed at Iran’s dangerous behavior--its continued proliferation activities, its human rights abuses, and its destabilizing activities in the region. 

“On June 9, we sanctioned the Iranian security forces for human rights abuses.  Earlier this week, we continued our efforts against the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which the UN Security Council 1737 Sanctions Committee noted has been involved in several violations of UN Security Council resolutions on Iran. 

“The steps we have taken this week seek to limit Iran’s ability to use the global financial system to pursue illicit activities.  We have made important progress in isolating Iran, but we cannot waver.  Our efforts must be unrelenting to sharpen the choice for Iran’s leaders to abandon their dangerous course.

“The United States and our partners remain fully committed to a diplomatic solution with Iran.  However, until Iran is prepared to engage seriously with us on such a solution, we will continue to increase pressure against Iranian entities of concern.”

Treasury Designates Ten Shipping Companies, Three Individuals Affiliated with Iran’s National Shipping Line

In Coordinated Action with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, Treasury Targets IRISL Front Companies and Executives in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

WASHINGTON – Continuing efforts to target the financial underpinnings of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced the designation of 10 shipping companies and three individuals affiliated with IRISL. Responding to Iran’s continued efforts to evade sanctions and its ongoing creation and use of new front companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates to protect IRISL and to advance its proliferation activities, today’s actions targeted IRISL’s operations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Singapore, China and the United Kingdom (UK).

“As the private sector around the world increasingly turns its back on Iran’s national shipping line, IRISL’s efforts to evade international sanctions and increased scrutiny have grown more and more desperate,” said OFAC Director Adam Szubin. “The persistent attempts by IRISL to deceive the world, including through the front companies identified today, attest to the weakness of IRISL as it tries to maintain a semblance of legitimacy while supporting Iran’s proliferation activities.”

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 – which is aimed at prohibiting transactions with, and freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems – Treasury today designated:

•UAE-based companies Pacific Shipping, Great Ocean Shipping Services, Azores Shipping, Atlantic Intermodal, Crystal Shipping and Pearl Shipping for acting for or on behalf of IRISL affiliate Oasis Freight Agency, designated by Treasury in September 2008, and/or IRISL.

•Top IRISL managers and executives Mohammad Moghaddami Fard and Ahmad Tafazoli. Fard is based in the UAE and is a director of IRISL affiliates and designated companies Oasis Freight Agency and Iran o Hind Shipping. Tafazoli is the managing director of IRISL Marine Services and Engineering Company (IMSENGCO), also designated by Treasury in September 2008.

•Alireza Ghezel Ayagh, Managing Director for Asia Marine Network, an IRISL front company in Singapore designated by Treasury in September 2008. Ghezel Ayagh is also a director of Singapore-based Leading Maritime, which was also designated today.

•Sinose Maritime, the agent of both Asia Marine Network and IRISL in Singapore.

•Santex Lines, IRISL’s regional office located in China. Ahmad Tafazoli is the General Manager for Santex Lines.

•Fairway Shipping, a shipping company located in the UK controlled by Mohammad Hadi Pajand, who Treasury designated in November 2010 for being company secretary of Irinvestship Ltd and director of Lancelin Shipping Company, two previously designated entities affiliated with IRISL.

In a coordinated action, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. today announced a 317-count indictment of 11 corporations and five individuals for their roles in a conspiracy involving IRISL and its affiliates to evade sanctions, in which the defendants repeatedly falsified the records of banks located in New York County to illegally access the U.S. financial system. 

Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., added, “Today our office is shining a spotlight on the fraudulent activities of IRISL, which has been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations for its role in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. IRISL and its sanctioned affiliates used a web of aliases or corporate alter egos across the globe to exploit the services of financial institutions located in Manhattan.  For sanctions to be effective, they must be enforced. New York remains the number one target of terrorist organizations around the world, and today's joint action will make it more difficult for Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism. It falls to both federal and state authorities to work cooperatively in an area vital to all of our security.”

IRISL was designated by Treasury in September 2008 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for its provision of logistical services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), the arm of the Iranian military that oversees its ballistic missile program. Since then, IRISL has been increasingly isolated from the international financial system and has in turn engaged in deceptive behavior to evade the impact of sanctions and increased scrutiny of its activities.  This behavior has included reliance on an expansive global network of front companies, falsifying shipping documents, changing the nominal ownership of vessels, and repainting and renaming ships, all to hide the affiliation of vessels with IRISL. Including today’s action, Treasury has designated 121 companies and individuals affiliated with IRISL since September 2008.

Identifying Information:

Entity:               Pacific Shipping DMCEST

Address:          206, Sharaf Building, Al Mina Road, Bur Dubai

                          Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Entity:               Great Ocean Shipping Services L.L.C.

Address:          2nd Floor, Sharaf Building, Al Mina Road, Bur Dubai,

                          Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Entity:               Azores Shipping Company LL FZE

Address:          P.O. Box 5232, Fujairah, United Arab Emirate

Entity:               Atlantic Intermodal

Location:         United Arab Emirates

Entity:               Crystal Shipping FZE

Location:         Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Entity:               Pearl Ship Management L.L.C.,

Location:         Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Individual:        Moghaddami Fard Mohammad

DOB:                July 19, 1956

Passport:         N10623175 (Iran) issued March 27, 2007; expires March 26, 2012

Individual:      Tafazoli, Ahmad

AKA:                Tafazoly, Ahmad

AKA:                Tafazzoli, Ahmad

DOB:               May 27, 1956

POB:                Bojnord, Iran

Passport:       R10748186 (Iran) issued January 22, 2007; expires January 22, 2012

Individual:      Ghezel Ayagh, Alireza

AKA:                Ghezelayagh, Alireza

DOB:               March 8, 1979

POB:                Kerman, Iran

Passport:        E12596608 (Iran)

Entity:             Sinose Maritime PTE. LTD.

Address:        200 Middle Road, #14-03/04 Prime Centre 188980, Singapore

Entity:             Santex Lines Limited

AKA:               Santex Shipping Company

AKA:               Santexlines

Address:        Suite 1501, Shanghai Zhongrong Plaza, 1088 Pudong (S)

                        Road, Shanghai  200122, China

Alt. Address:  F23A-D, Times Plaza No. 1, Taizi Road,

                        Shekou, Shenzhen  518067, China

Entity:             Leading Maritime PTE. LTD

AKA:              Leadmarine

Address:          200 Middle Road, #14-01 Prime Centre 188980, Singapore

Entity:             Fairway Shipping LTD

Address:          83 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0HW, United Kingdom