Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of five individuals, including four senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) officers connected to a plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. As part of today’s action, Treasury also designated the individual responsible for arranging the assassination plot on behalf of the IRGC-QF.

 

Designated today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF were: Manssor Arbabsiar, a naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports who acted on behalf of the IRGC-QF to pursue the failed plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador; IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani; Hamed Abdollahi, a senior IRGC-QF official who coordinated aspects of the plot and oversaw the other Qods Force officials directly responsible for coordinating and planning this operation; Abdul Reza Shahlai, an IRGC-QF official who coordinated this operation; and Ali Gholam Shakuri, an IRGC-QF official and deputy to Shahlai, who met with Arbabsiar on several occasions to discuss the assassination and other planned attacks.

 

Arbabsiar and Shakuri were named by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York in a criminal complaint unsealed today connected with the IRGC-QF plot. Among the charges brought against them was conspiracy to engage in foreign travel and use interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. According to the criminal complaint, Arbabsiar arranged for $100,000 to be sent from Tehran to the U.S. as a down payment for the assassination of the Saudi ambassador. Two wire transfers totaling approximately $100,000 were sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to a bank in the United States, to the account of the person recruited by Arbabsiar to carry out the assassination.

 

“Iran once again has used the Qods Force and the international financial system to pursue an act of international terrorism, this time aimed against a Saudi diplomat,” said David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “The financial transactions at the heart of this plot lay bare the risk that banks and other institutions face in doing business with Iran.”

 

As a result of today’s designations, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these individuals, and any assets they may hold in the U.S. are frozen.

 

Manssor Arbabsiar

Arbabsiar met on a number of occasions with senior IRGC-QF officials regarding this plot and acted on behalf of senior Qods Force officials – including his cousin Abdul Reza Shahlai and Shahlai’s deputy Gholam Shakuri – to execute the plot. During one such meeting, a $100,000 payment for the murder of the Saudi ambassador was approved by the IRGC-QF. After this meeting, Arbabsiar arranged for approximately $100,000 to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States, to the account of the person he recruited to carry out the assassination.

 

Qasem Soleimani

As IRGC-QF Commander, Qasem Soleimani oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were involved in this plot. Soleimani was previously designated by the Treasury Department under E.O. 13382 based on his relationship to the IRGC. He was also designated in May 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13572, which targets human rights abuses in Syria, for his role as the Commander of the IRGC-QF, the primary conduit for Iran's support to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID).

 

Hamed Abdollahi

Abdollahi is also a senior IRGC-QF officer who coordinated aspects of this operation. Abdollahi oversees other Qods Force officials – including Shahlai – who were responsible for coordinating and planning this operation.

 

Abdul Reza Shahlai

Shahlai is an IRGC-QF official who coordinated the plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. Shahlai worked through his cousin, Mansour Arbabsiar, who was named in the criminal complaint for conspiring to bring the IRGC-QF’s plot to fruition. Shahlai approved financial allotments to Arbabsiar to help recruit other individuals for the plot, approving $5 million dollars as payment for all of the operations discussed.

 

Shahlai was designated by Treasury in September 2008 pursuant to E.O. 13438 for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq.

 

Ali Gholam Shakuri

Shakuri is an IRGC-QF officer and deputy to Abdul Reza Shahlai who acted on behalf of Shahlai in support of this plot. Shakuri provided financial support to Arbabsiar and met with Arbabsiar several times to discuss the planned assassination and other attacks. With Shakuri’s approval, Arbabsiar arranged for the $100,000 down payment to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States.

 

Background on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force

The IRGC-QF is the Government of Iran’s primary foreign action arm for executing its policy of supporting terrorist organizations and extremist groups around the world. The IRGC-QF provides training, logistical assistance and material and financial support to militants and terrorist operatives, including the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

 

IRGC-QF officers and their associates have supported attacks against U.S. and allied troops and diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF continues to train, equip and fund Iraqi Shia militant groups – such as Kata'ib and Hizballah – and elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan to prevent an increase in Western influence in the region. In the Levant, the IRGC-QF supports terrorist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas, which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East.

 

The Government of Iran also uses the IRGC and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, the IRGC and the Iranian government.

 

The IRGC-QF was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for its support for terrorism, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13572 of April 2011 as the conduit for Iran's support to Syria’s GID, the overarching civilian intelligence service in Syria which has been involved in human rights abuses in Syria.

President Obama Signs New Executive Order Isolating the Government of Syria from the U.S. Financial System, Imposes Sanctions Against Syria’s Energy Sector

WASHINGTON – President Obama signed an Executive Order imposing additional sanctions against the Government of Syria today, freezing any assets of the Government of Syria in the United States and banning the importation into the United States of petroleum or petroleum products of Syrian origin.

Responding to the continuing escalation of violence against the people of Syria, this Order reflects the ongoing commitment of the U.S. to ensure that any assets of the Syrian government subject to U.S. jurisdiction cannot be used to further the Syrian regime’s campaign of violence and repression against Syrian citizens. 

“The President took decisive action today to add force to his call for Bashar al-Asad to step down by imposing far-reaching sanctions targeting the entire Government of Syria and its energy sector,” said Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner. “This Order strikes at a crucial revenue stream for Syria’s government and, together with our continuing targeted sanctions, will disrupt the Asad regime’s ability to finance its campaign of violence against the Syrian people.”

Blocking the Government of Syria’s Access to the U.S. Financial System

The Order significantly escalates financial pressure on the Government of Syria, which includes its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities, by denying it access to the U.S. financial system and prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions or dealings with it. 

The Order also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to apply sanctions against persons determined to be owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, or to have provided support for the Government of Syria or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order.  

Energy Sector Sanctions

In issuing this Order, the President has directly targeted Syria’s petroleum exports – a significant source of government revenue – by banning the importation into the United States of Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products and prohibiting U.S. persons, wherever located, from engaging in any transactions or dealings in or related to Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products.

Also today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury identified the following entities as Government of Syria entities, therefore subject to sanctions under the new Executive Order:

•The General Petroleum Corporation: The state-owned company that controls Syria’s oil and gas industry and is responsible for the exploration, development and investment of Syria’s oil and gas exploration activities. The General Petroleum Corporation supervises the following affiliate state-owned companies, also identified today:

◦Syrian Petroleum Company: Responsible for upstream oil production and development in Syria. ◦Syrian Company for Oil Transport: Manages Syria’s domestic pipeline system and is responsible for transporting all Syrian crude and petroleum products. Syrian Company for Oil Transport manages Syria’s three major oil export/import terminals: Baniyas, Tartous and Latakia.

◦Syrian Gas Company: Responsible for processing, transporting and marketing Syria’s natural gas.

•SYTROL: Syria’s state oil marketing firm that is responsible for selling Syrian crude to foreign buyers. Export Ban This Order also prohibits the exportation or re-exportation of services from the United States, or by U.S. persons, to Syria – supplementing an existing export ban on most products of the United States to Syria. New investment in Syria by a U.S. person, wherever located, is also prohibited under the Order.

Export Ban

This Order also prohibits the exportation or re-exportation of services from the United States, or by U.S. persons, to Syria – supplementing an existing export ban on most products of the United States to Syria. New investment in Syria by a U.S. person, wherever located, is also prohibited under the Order.

Treasury Sanctions State-Owned Syrian Financial Institutions and Syria’s Largest Mobile Phone Operator

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of the Commercial Bank of Syria, a Syrian state-owned financial institution, and its Lebanon-based subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and Syriatel, the largest mobile phone operator in Syria, pursuant to E.O. 13572.

“By exposing Syria’s largest commercial bank as an agent for designated Syrian and North Korean proliferators, and by targeting Syria’s largest mobile phone operator for being controlled by one of the regime’s most corrupt insiders, we are taking aim at the financial infrastructure that is helping provide support to Asad and his regime’s illicit activities,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

E.O. 13382 is an authority that targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters, and E.O. 13572 targets Syrian officials and others responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. As a result of today’s actions, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with the Commercial Bank of Syria, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank and Syriatel, and any assets of these entities under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Commercial Bank of Syria and Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank

The Commercial Bank of Syria, a Syrian state-owned financial institution based in Damascus with approximately 50 branches, was designated today for providing financial services to Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) and North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank (Tanchon). SSRC and Tanchon were listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for their support for WMD proliferation by Syria and North Korea, respectively. The Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank was designated today for being owned or controlled by the Commercial Bank of Syria.

SSRC controls Syria’s missile production facilities and oversees Syria’s facilities to develop unconventional weapons and their delivery systems.  The Commercial Bank of Syria has continued to provide financial services to the SSRC and associated companies following the SSRC’s designation, including the maintenance of bank accounts and financing for purchases that permit the SSRC and associated companies to advance Syria’s WMD programs. For example, in 2010, SSRC arranged financing through the Commercial Bank of Syria for missile-related purchases.

The Commercial Bank of Syria also holds an account for Tanchon, the primary financial agent for the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), North Korea’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID was also listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

The Commercial Bank of Syria has also engaged in dealings with several Iranian banks designated by Treasury under E.O. 13382, including the Export Development Bank of Iran, Bank Saderat and Bank Melli.

The Commercial Bank of Syria was identified by Treasury as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT ACT in May 2004, and issued its Final Rule in March 2006. The Commercial Bank of Syria remains in control of much of the Syrian banking market and controls most public sector contracts. In light of today’s designation, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has issued an advisory to alert U.S. financial institutions of the Commercial Bank of Syria’s continued involvement in illicit financial activities.

Syriatel

Syriatel, the largest mobile phone operator in Syria, was designated today for being owned or controlled by Rami Makhluf, a powerful Syrian businessman and regime insider designated under E.O. 13460 in February 2008 for improperly benefitting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.

Treasury identified Syriatel as property blocked pursuant to E.O. 13460 in July 2008 because of Makhluf’s majority ownership interest in the company. Despite attempts to obscure his controlling interest in Syriatel, Makhluf has continued to own and run the telecommunications company.

Syriatel was also designated today for being owned and controlled by Al Mashreq Investment Fund – a firm designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13572 in May 2011 for being owned and controlled by Makhluf. Al Mashreq Investment Fund is Syriatel’s largest shareholder.

Treasury Sanctions Prominent Syrian Businessman

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today the designation of Muhammad Hamsho, a member of the Syrian Parliament and prominent businessman, pursuant to Executive Orders (E.O.) 13573 and 13572 for providing services in support of, and for acting for or on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and for acting for or on behalf of President Asad’s brother Mahir al-Asad. Hamsho International Group, a Syrian holding company that has approximately 20 subsidiary or affiliated companies, was also designated today pursuant to E.O.s 13573 and 13572 for being controlled by Muhammad Hamsho. 

E.O. 13573 targets senior officials of the Government of Syria. The U.S. imposed sanctions against President Bashar al-Asad in May 2011 by listing him in the Annex to E.O. 13573. E.O. 13572 targets Syrian officials and others responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. Mahir al-Asad was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13572 in April 2011 for the leading role he played in the Syrian regime’s actions in Dar’a, where protesters have been killed by Syrian security forces. 

“Muhammad Hamsho earned his fortune through his connections to regime insiders, and during the current unrest, he has cast his lot with Bashar al-Asad, Mahir al-Asad and others responsible for the Syrian government’s violence and intimidation against the Syrian people,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “The sanctions we are applying today to Hamsho and his company are the direct consequence of his actions.”

Hamsho is one of Syria’s top businessmen and has interests in nearly every sector of the Syrian economy. He is a close business associate of Mahir al-Asad and has served as a frontman for him and a number of Asad’s businesses. He has provided gifts to gain the favor of senior Syrian officials and has served as a front to mask a senior Syrian official’s illicit and licit financial and business transactions.  Members of the Syrian business community believe that Hamsho is a successful businessman because of his relationship to Syrian elites rather than his business acumen.  In addition, during Hamsho’s successful bids for election to the Syrian parliament, he paid large sums of money to secure his seat.

Hamsho International Group has interests in the fabrication of metal products; distribution of construction, electrical machinery, equipment, and chemicals; civil contracting for water, oil, gas, petrochemicals, buildings, and infrastructure projects; trade in telecommunication products, computers, and computer peripherals; provision of internet services; television production; ownership and management of hotels and resorts; car rental; distribution of carpets; animal farming and trade in horses; printing services; and production of ice cream.

As one of the company’s main shareholders, Hamsho is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hamsho International Group and is listed as the company’s Chief Executive Officer and General Manager.

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with today’s designees and any assets they may hold subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.