Treasury Sanctions Three Drug Traffickers Tied to Mexican Drug Lord Chapo Guzman

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today designated three individuals with ties to Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquin Guzman Loera (a.k.a. Chapo Guzman) as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers (SDNTs) pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from conducting financial or commercial transactions with the designees and any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

 

“Today marks the fourth time in the past year that OFAC has targeted and exposed the support structures of the organization led by Chapo Guzman, the world’s most powerful drug trafficker,” said OFAC Director, Adam J. Szubin. “OFAC will continue to work with law enforcement and foreign counterparts to help disrupt, and eventually dismantle, Chapo Guzman’s criminal empire.”

 

Two of the individuals designated today, Mexican nationals Oscar Alvarez Zepeda and Joel Valdez Benites, are from Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico. The other individual, Colombian national Carlos Mario Torres Hoyos, is from Medellin, Colombia. These three individuals provide material support to the drug trafficking activities of Guzman Loera and the Sinaloa Cartel and also have ties to Colombian drug trafficker Jorge Milton Cifuentes Villa. Oscar Alvarez Zepeda is the brother of the previously-designated Mexican national Alfredo Alvarez Zepeda. The Alvarez Zepeda brothers are relatives of Chapo Guzman.

 

Guzman Loera and the Sinaloa Cartel were identified by the President as drug kingpins pursuant to the Kingpin Act in 2001 and 2009, respectively. OFAC designated Cifuentes Villa as an SDNT in February 2011 along with more than 70 other individuals and entities. Guzman Loera and Jorge Milton Cifuentes Villa were indicted on drug trafficking and/or money laundering charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in November 2010. In February 2011, Jorge Milton Cifuentes Villa was also indicted on drug trafficking charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

 

OFAC coordinated on this investigation with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Today’s action is part of ongoing efforts pursuant to the Kingpin Act to apply financial measures against significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations worldwide. Treasury has designated more than 1,000 individuals and entities pursuant to the Kingpin Act since June 2000.

 

Penalties for violations of the Kingpin Act range from civil penalties of up to $1.075 million per violation to more severe criminal penalties. Criminal penalties for corporate officers may include up to 30 years in prison and fines up to $5 million. Criminal fines for corporations may reach $10 million. Other individuals face up to 10 years in prison and fines pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code for criminal violations of the Kingpin Act.

U.S., European Union Closer to Trade Mutual Recognition Decision

Washington – U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the European Union Taxation and Customs Union Directorate agreed to language for the U.S.-EU Mutual Recognition Decision today which will lead to its signing in the Spring of 2012. Once signed, the Mutual Recognition Decision will recognize the respective trade partnership programs of the U.S. and the EU—CBP’s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the EU’s Authorized Economic Operator—with reciprocal benefits.

 

“The U.S. and the European Union are one step closer to a mutual recognition decision that will facilitate trade while increasing security of the global supply chain,” said CBP Assistant Commissioner Thomas Winkowski.

 

In 2007, CBP and TAXUD initiated efforts to implement Mutual Recognition between C-TPAT and AEO. Mutual Recognition is an industry partnership program that creates a unified and sustainable security posture that can assist in securing and facilitating global cargo trade. Upon achieving mutual recognition with a foreign partner, one program may recognize the validation findings of the other program.

 

C-TPAT is a voluntary government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security. C-TPAT recognizes that U.S. Customs and Border Protection can provide the highest level of cargo security only through close cooperation with the ultimate owners of the international supply chain such as importers, carriers, consolidators, licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers. CBP currently has mutual recognition with: New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Korea and Jordan.

 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland Security charged with the management, control and protection of our nation's borders at and between the official ports of entry. CBP is charged with keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing hundreds of U.S. laws.

Treasury Designates Iranian Commercial Airline Linked to Iran's Support for Terrorism

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today the designation of Iranian commercial airline Mahan Air pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Based in Tehran, Mahan Air provides transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel services to the IRGC-QF.

 

“Mahan Air’s close coordination with the IRGC-QF – secretly ferrying operatives, weapons and funds on its flights – reveals yet another facet of the IRGC’s extensive infiltration of Iran’s commercial sector to facilitate its support for terrorism,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.  “Following the revelation about the IRGC-QF’s use of the international financial system to fund its murder-for-hire plot, today’s action highlights further the undeniable risks of doing business with Iran.”

 

Mahan Air provided travel services to IRGC-QF personnel flown to and from Iran and Syria for military training. Mahan Air also facilitated the covert travel of suspected IRGC-QF officers into and out of Iraq by bypassing normal security procedures and not including information on flight manifests to eliminate records of the IRGC-QF travel.

 

Mahan Air crews have facilitated IRGC-QF arms shipments. Funds were also transferred via Mahan Air for the procurement of controlled goods by the IRGC-QF.

 

In addition to the reasons for which Mahan Air is being designated today, Mahan Air also provides transportation services to Hizballah, a Lebanon-based designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Mahan Air has transported personnel, weapons and goods on behalf of Hizballah and omitted from Mahan Air cargo manifests secret weapons shipments bound for Hizballah.

 

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with Mahan Air and any assets it may hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

 

Identifying Information:

 

Entity: Mahan Air

AKA: Mahan Travel Company

Address: Mahan Air Tower, 21st Floor, Azadeghan Street, Karaj Highway, P.O. Box 14515-411, Tehran, Iran

Alt. Address:  Mahan Air Tower, Azadegan St., Karaj Highway, Tehran 1481655761, Iran P.O. Box 411-14515

Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of five individuals, including four senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) officers connected to a plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. As part of today’s action, Treasury also designated the individual responsible for arranging the assassination plot on behalf of the IRGC-QF.

 

Designated today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF were: Manssor Arbabsiar, a naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports who acted on behalf of the IRGC-QF to pursue the failed plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador; IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani; Hamed Abdollahi, a senior IRGC-QF official who coordinated aspects of the plot and oversaw the other Qods Force officials directly responsible for coordinating and planning this operation; Abdul Reza Shahlai, an IRGC-QF official who coordinated this operation; and Ali Gholam Shakuri, an IRGC-QF official and deputy to Shahlai, who met with Arbabsiar on several occasions to discuss the assassination and other planned attacks.

 

Arbabsiar and Shakuri were named by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York in a criminal complaint unsealed today connected with the IRGC-QF plot. Among the charges brought against them was conspiracy to engage in foreign travel and use interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. According to the criminal complaint, Arbabsiar arranged for $100,000 to be sent from Tehran to the U.S. as a down payment for the assassination of the Saudi ambassador. Two wire transfers totaling approximately $100,000 were sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to a bank in the United States, to the account of the person recruited by Arbabsiar to carry out the assassination.

 

“Iran once again has used the Qods Force and the international financial system to pursue an act of international terrorism, this time aimed against a Saudi diplomat,” said David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “The financial transactions at the heart of this plot lay bare the risk that banks and other institutions face in doing business with Iran.”

 

As a result of today’s designations, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these individuals, and any assets they may hold in the U.S. are frozen.

 

Manssor Arbabsiar

Arbabsiar met on a number of occasions with senior IRGC-QF officials regarding this plot and acted on behalf of senior Qods Force officials – including his cousin Abdul Reza Shahlai and Shahlai’s deputy Gholam Shakuri – to execute the plot. During one such meeting, a $100,000 payment for the murder of the Saudi ambassador was approved by the IRGC-QF. After this meeting, Arbabsiar arranged for approximately $100,000 to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States, to the account of the person he recruited to carry out the assassination.

 

Qasem Soleimani

As IRGC-QF Commander, Qasem Soleimani oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were involved in this plot. Soleimani was previously designated by the Treasury Department under E.O. 13382 based on his relationship to the IRGC. He was also designated in May 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13572, which targets human rights abuses in Syria, for his role as the Commander of the IRGC-QF, the primary conduit for Iran's support to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID).

 

Hamed Abdollahi

Abdollahi is also a senior IRGC-QF officer who coordinated aspects of this operation. Abdollahi oversees other Qods Force officials – including Shahlai – who were responsible for coordinating and planning this operation.

 

Abdul Reza Shahlai

Shahlai is an IRGC-QF official who coordinated the plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, while he was in the United States and to carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country. Shahlai worked through his cousin, Mansour Arbabsiar, who was named in the criminal complaint for conspiring to bring the IRGC-QF’s plot to fruition. Shahlai approved financial allotments to Arbabsiar to help recruit other individuals for the plot, approving $5 million dollars as payment for all of the operations discussed.

 

Shahlai was designated by Treasury in September 2008 pursuant to E.O. 13438 for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq.

 

Ali Gholam Shakuri

Shakuri is an IRGC-QF officer and deputy to Abdul Reza Shahlai who acted on behalf of Shahlai in support of this plot. Shakuri provided financial support to Arbabsiar and met with Arbabsiar several times to discuss the planned assassination and other attacks. With Shakuri’s approval, Arbabsiar arranged for the $100,000 down payment to be sent from a non-Iranian foreign bank to the United States.

 

Background on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force

The IRGC-QF is the Government of Iran’s primary foreign action arm for executing its policy of supporting terrorist organizations and extremist groups around the world. The IRGC-QF provides training, logistical assistance and material and financial support to militants and terrorist operatives, including the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

 

IRGC-QF officers and their associates have supported attacks against U.S. and allied troops and diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF continues to train, equip and fund Iraqi Shia militant groups – such as Kata'ib and Hizballah – and elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan to prevent an increase in Western influence in the region. In the Levant, the IRGC-QF supports terrorist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas, which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East.

 

The Government of Iran also uses the IRGC and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, the IRGC and the Iranian government.

 

The IRGC-QF was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for its support for terrorism, and was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13572 of April 2011 as the conduit for Iran's support to Syria’s GID, the overarching civilian intelligence service in Syria which has been involved in human rights abuses in Syria.

Treasury Sanctions Lashkar-e Tayyiba Leaders and Founders

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of two Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LET) leaders and founding members, Zafar Iqbal and Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224.

"Zafar Iqbal and Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi are two of LET's most significant leaders," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. "Over the past 20 years, Iqbal and Bhuttavi have been responsible for fundraising, recruitment, and indoctrination of operatives.  By targeting the core of LET’s leadership, today's action aims to degrade its ability to facilitate its terrorist activities.”

LET is a Pakistan-based terrorist group with links to the al-Qa’ida network and its former leader Usama bin Laden that is responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and July 2006 Mumbai train bombings. LET was designated by the U.S. pursuant to E.O. 13224 and named a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2001, and was added to the UN 1267/1989 list in May 2005.  Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) was designated as an alias of LET under E.O. 13224 in April 2006 and was added to the UN 1267/1989 list as an alias of LET in December 2008. 

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with Zafar Iqbal and Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi and any assets they may have in the U.S. are frozen.

Zafar Iqbal

Zafar Iqbal is a senior leader and co-founder of LET, has served in various LET/JUD senior leadership positions and was once considered LET/JUD’s second-in-command.  As of late 2010, Iqbal was in charge of LET/JUD’s finance department. Zafar Iqbal has also been involved in LET/JUD fundraising activities. As of 2008, he was identified as LET/JUD’s chief of fundraising, and in 2010, Iqbal was overseeing the construction of an LET/JUD facility.

From 2003 to 2010, Iqbal was also the director of LET/JUD’s education department. In this capacity, Iqbal has been involved in recruiting activities on behalf of the group and has prepared the curricula for schools run by LET/JUD in Pakistan. As of 2010, Iqbal was a joint secretary of a university trust created by LET/JUD to carry out activities on behalf of the group.

Iqbal formed LET in the late 1980s with current LET/JUD emir Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, designated by the U.S. pursuant to E.O. 13224 in May 2008, and by the UN in December 2008. In 1989 or 1990, Iqbal traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with LET/JUD emir Hafiz Muhammad Saeed to request financial support from Usama bin Laden.

Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi

Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhuttavi is a founding member of LET and deputy to LET/JUD emir Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Bhuttavi has served as the acting emir of LET/JUD on at least two occasions, including when Saeed was detained in the days after the November 2008 Mumbai attack and held until June 2009. Bhuttavi handled the group’s day-to-day functions during this period.

Bhuttavi also helped prepare the operatives for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks by delivering lectures on the merits of martyrdom. Bhuttavi has issued fatwas authorizing LET/JUD’s militant operations, has instructed group leaders and members, and is responsible for LET/JUD’s madrassah network. In mid-2002, Bhuttavi was in charge of establishing an LET/JUD organizational base in Lahore, Pakistan.

Treasury Sanctions Three Senior Members of the Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist Network

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of Umar Patek, Abdul Rahim Ba’asyir and Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman, three senior members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the Southeast Asia-based designated terrorist network with links to al-Qa’ida.

“These three men have demonstrated their commitment to violence,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Today’s actions are intended to disrupt their ability to access the international financial system to support their deadly agendas.”

Today’s designations were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets for sanctions terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these individuals, and assets they may hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Umar Patek

Umar Patek is a senior member of the JI network and has planned and funded multiple JI terrorist attacks in the Philippines and Indonesia. Patek has also trained operatives associated with the terrorist organization the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and personally developed explosive devices for this Philippines-based organization. He was detained in Pakistan in early 2011 and was recently extradited from Pakistan to Indonesia.  

As of early 2010, Patek was considered to be one of the JI network’s top leaders. In his capacity as a leader of the JI network in Mindanao, the Philippines, Patek received approximately $29,000 to cover his expenses and all of his JI group’s militant activities in the Southern Philippines. Patek obtained funding for operations that were to include a large-scale car bombing in metropolitan Manila, attacks on Philippine military camps in Mindanao and assassinations of prominent foreigners.

In 2002, Patek was involved in planning and preparing for the October 2002 Bali attacks. A few weeks before the blasts, Patek attended the meeting in Solo, Central Java, Indonesia, where participants — including now deceased JI leaders Dulmatin, Samudra and Mukhlas — agreed to execute the Bali bombings. Patek also was personally involved in assembling the van bomb and explosives used in the Bali attack.

As of mid-2007, Patek and JI leader Dulmatin were teaching ASG members bomb-making techniques including training in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The IEDs were intended to block Armed Forces of Philippine troops who might be in pursuit of JI and the ASG. As of early 2006, Patek had built bombs for the ASG using 60 mm mortar bombs.

Abdul Rahim Ba’asyir (Abdul Rahim)

Abdul Rahim Ba’asyir is a JI network leader who has trained and led JI operatives in South and Southeast Asia since the late 1990s, and has provided facilitation and other support to al-Qa’ida. As of mid-2009, Abdul Rahim was regarded as a senior JI leader with the ability to instigate violence. 

In 2005, Abdul Rahim was selected as the leader of JI’s administrative region, Wakalah, in central Java, Indonesia. As such, Abdul Rahim was responsible for overseeing JI cells, had full knowledge of certain JI operations in Indonesia in 2005 and 2006 and maintained close relations with clandestine elements of JI in 2007.

Abdul Rahim served from the late 1990s until 2002 as a leader of JI’s Al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi, Pakistan. A smaller organization modeled after JI, Al-Ghuraba was formed with the approval of al-Qa’ida and JI leader Hambali to groom the next generation of JI leaders, provide them with training in weapons and explosives and give them firsthand experience in militant operations. Hambali also planned for Al-Ghuraba to become a cover entity for supporting the travel of JI operatives to obtain al-Qa’ida training in Afghanistan. 

Abdul Rahim was appointed by Hambali to lead JI’s Al-Ghuraba cell because Abdul Rahim was a recognized figure within JI and al-Qa’ida. As the Al-Ghuraba leader, Abdul Rahim indoctrinated students to become future JI leaders and instructed that Al-Ghuraba cell members should kill Americans at every opportunity. Abdul Rahim also taught them how to carry out a hijacking operation. Hambali was designated by the United States pursuant to E.O. 13224 and added to the United Nations (UN) 1267 Committee’s list in January 2003.

While in Pakistan and Afghanistan from the late 1990s to mid-2002, Abdul Rahim also served as JI’s main contact with al-Qa’ida and played a key facilitation role for al-Qa’ida. Abdul Rahim swore an oath of loyalty to Usama bin Laden and provided logistical, communications and media support to al-Qa’ida in several instances. Abdul Rahim also served the role of an al-Qa’ida conduit for fighters in Pakistan and as an intermediary between Hambali and al-Qa’ida, relaying messages between them.

Abdul Rahim was one of several al-Qa’ida members who controlled an al-Qa’ida media center in Afghanistan and directed its activities. The media center produced videos and photos for al-Qa’ida propaganda. In May 2001, Abdul Rahim was also present at a meeting of selected 9/11 hijackers in Afghanistan and likely participated in making the videos of their last wills and testaments. Upon returning to Indonesia in 2002, Abdul Rahim continued to provide support for al-Qa’ida. As of early 2004, Abdul Rahim was reportedly al-Qa’ida’s only contact in Southeast Asia. Abdul Rahim regularly passed information to a senior al-Qa’ida operative known as Abu Talha until at least mid-2004.

Abdul Rahim has also been involved in JI's outreach to the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LET). Sometime after 1999, Abdul Rahim was tasked by JI member Zulkarnaen to run a madrassa in Pakistan and was encouraged to expand cooperation between JI and LET through this madrassa. Zulkarnaen was designated by the United States pursuant to E.O. 13224 and added to the UN 1267 Committee’s list in May 2005.

Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman (Jibril)

Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman is a senior member of the JI network and has been directly involved in obtaining funding for terrorist attacks and other JI-linked operational activities. Jibril has solicited funds on behalf of now-deceased senior JI member Noordin Mohammad Top, who led the JI faction that conducted the group's July 2009 attacks, which killed seven people and wounded approximately 50 others in Jakarta. At a meeting with Top and Saefudin Zuhri, the now deceased main plotter of the July 2009 bombings, Jibril agreed to provide Top with funding for terrorist operations. He then contacted his brother to request that he arrange for approximately $10,000 in cash to be passed to Top. 

A letter found on Top’s laptop written by Zuhri identified Jibril as the connection between Top’s network and foreigners providing funding.

As of late 2008, Jibril was working on behalf of JI member Imam Samudra and the other JI Bali bombers. Samudra was executed by a firing squad in Indonesia in November 2008 for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed 202 people.

Jibril was a senior member of JI’s Pakistan-based Al-Ghuraba cell and had been carefully preselected for travel to Pakistan as a member of that cell. While in Pakistan, Jibril participated in military training and in 2001 was dispatched to Kashmir by JI member and Al-Ghuraba cell leader Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan. Gunawan was designated by the U.S. pursuant to E.O. 13224 and added to the UN 1267 Committee’s list in April 2006. Jibril returned to Pakistan in 2007, where he met with al-Qa’ida and Taliban personnel.

He was sentenced in Indonesia to five years in jail in June 2010 for concealing information about terrorist crimes in connection with the July 2009 attacks in Jakarta and for falsifying documents. 

Treasury Sanctions State-Owned Syrian Financial Institutions and Syria’s Largest Mobile Phone Operator

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of the Commercial Bank of Syria, a Syrian state-owned financial institution, and its Lebanon-based subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and Syriatel, the largest mobile phone operator in Syria, pursuant to E.O. 13572.

“By exposing Syria’s largest commercial bank as an agent for designated Syrian and North Korean proliferators, and by targeting Syria’s largest mobile phone operator for being controlled by one of the regime’s most corrupt insiders, we are taking aim at the financial infrastructure that is helping provide support to Asad and his regime’s illicit activities,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

E.O. 13382 is an authority that targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters, and E.O. 13572 targets Syrian officials and others responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. As a result of today’s actions, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with the Commercial Bank of Syria, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank and Syriatel, and any assets of these entities under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Commercial Bank of Syria and Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank

The Commercial Bank of Syria, a Syrian state-owned financial institution based in Damascus with approximately 50 branches, was designated today for providing financial services to Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) and North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank (Tanchon). SSRC and Tanchon were listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 for their support for WMD proliferation by Syria and North Korea, respectively. The Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank was designated today for being owned or controlled by the Commercial Bank of Syria.

SSRC controls Syria’s missile production facilities and oversees Syria’s facilities to develop unconventional weapons and their delivery systems.  The Commercial Bank of Syria has continued to provide financial services to the SSRC and associated companies following the SSRC’s designation, including the maintenance of bank accounts and financing for purchases that permit the SSRC and associated companies to advance Syria’s WMD programs. For example, in 2010, SSRC arranged financing through the Commercial Bank of Syria for missile-related purchases.

The Commercial Bank of Syria also holds an account for Tanchon, the primary financial agent for the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), North Korea’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID was also listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

The Commercial Bank of Syria has also engaged in dealings with several Iranian banks designated by Treasury under E.O. 13382, including the Export Development Bank of Iran, Bank Saderat and Bank Melli.

The Commercial Bank of Syria was identified by Treasury as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT ACT in May 2004, and issued its Final Rule in March 2006. The Commercial Bank of Syria remains in control of much of the Syrian banking market and controls most public sector contracts. In light of today’s designation, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has issued an advisory to alert U.S. financial institutions of the Commercial Bank of Syria’s continued involvement in illicit financial activities.

Syriatel

Syriatel, the largest mobile phone operator in Syria, was designated today for being owned or controlled by Rami Makhluf, a powerful Syrian businessman and regime insider designated under E.O. 13460 in February 2008 for improperly benefitting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.

Treasury identified Syriatel as property blocked pursuant to E.O. 13460 in July 2008 because of Makhluf’s majority ownership interest in the company. Despite attempts to obscure his controlling interest in Syriatel, Makhluf has continued to own and run the telecommunications company.

Syriatel was also designated today for being owned and controlled by Al Mashreq Investment Fund – a firm designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13572 in May 2011 for being owned and controlled by Makhluf. Al Mashreq Investment Fund is Syriatel’s largest shareholder.

Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of six members of an al-Qa’ida network headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil, a prominent Iran-based al-Qa’ida facilitator, operating under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government. Today’s action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, demonstrates that Iran is a critical transit point for funding to support al-Qa’ida’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This network serves as the core pipeline through which al-Qa’ida moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia, including to Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a key al-Qa’ida leader based in Pakistan, also designated today.

“Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today. By exposing Iran’s secret deal with al-Qa’ida allowing it to funnel funds and operatives through its territory, we are illuminating yet another aspect of Iran’s unmatched support for terrorism,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “Today’s action also seeks to disrupt this key network and deny al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership much-needed support.”

As a result of today’s action, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with the designees, and any assets they may hold under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen. Treasury designated the following individuals today:

Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al-Suri) is an Iran-based senior al-Qa’ida facilitator currently living and operating in Iran under an agreement between al-Qa’ida and the Iranian government. Iranian authorities maintain a relationship with Khalil and have permitted him to operate within Iran’s borders since 2005. Khalil moves money and recruits from across the Middle East into Iran, then on to Pakistan for the benefit of al-Qa’ida senior leaders, including Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Khalil has collected funding from various donors and fundraisers throughout the Gulf and is responsible for moving significant amounts of money via Iran for onward passage to al-Qa’ida’s leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has also facilitated the travel of extremist recruits for al-Qa’ida from the Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan via Iran. Khalil requires each operative to deliver $10,000 to al-Qa’ida in Pakistan.

As al-Qa’ida’s representative in Iran, Khalil works with the Iranian government to arrange releases of al-Qa’ida personnel from Iranian prisons. When al-Qa’ida operatives are released, the Iranian government transfers them to Khalil, who then facilitates their travel to Pakistan.

Atiyah Abd al-Rahman

Al-Rahman is al-Qa’ida’s overall commander in Pakistan’s tribal areas and as of late 2010, the leader of al-Qa’ida in North and South Waziristan, Pakistan. Rahman was previously appointed by Usama bin Laden to serve as al-Qa’ida’s emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of Iranian officials.

Umid Muhammadi

Muhammadi is an al-Qa’ida facilitator and key supporter of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Muhammadi has petitioned Iranian officials on al-Qa’ida’s behalf to release operatives detained in Iran. Muhammadi has been involved in planning multiple attacks in Iraq and has trained extremists in the use of explosives. He has also received training in Afghanistan on the use of rockets and chemicals.

Salim Hasan Khalifa Rashid al-Kuwari

Al-Kuwari provides financial and logistical support to al-Qa’ida, primarily through al­-Qa’ida facilitators in Iran. Based in Qatar, Kuwari has provided hundreds of thousands of dollars in financial support to al-Qa’ida and has provided funding for al-Qa’ida operations, as well as to secure the release of al-Qa’ida detainees in Iran and elsewhere. He has also facilitated travel for extremist recruits on behalf of senior al-Qa’ida facilitators based in Iran.

Abdallah Ghanim Mafuz Muslim al-Khawar

Al-Khawar has worked with Kuwari to deliver money, messages and other material support to al-Qa’ida elements in Iran. Like Kuwari, Khawar is based in Qatar and has helped to facilitate travel for extremists interested in traveling to Afghanistan for jihad.

‘Ali Hasan ‘Ali al-’Ajmi

Al-’Ajmi is a Kuwait-based associate of Khalil who provides financial and facilitation support to al-Qa’ida, AQI and the Taliban. ‘Ajmi has collected money from individuals in Gulf countries and provided these funds to AQI facilitators as well as to the Taliban. He has also supported al-Qa’ida by facilitating travel for individuals associated with the group so that they could take part in fighting in Afghanistan.